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- ◆ Beogradski tisak i obavještajni rat

Dr. Slaven Letica • Dr. Mario Nobilo

# ARMIA RAT PROTIV HRVATSKE



## KOS-Tajni dokumenti



Slaven Letica ● Mario Nobilo

**JNA**  
**Rat protiv**  
**Hrvatske**

**Scenarij vojnog udara u Hrvatskoj i  
metode specijalnog rata u njegovoj  
pripremi**

Posebna izdanja GLOBUSA  
Zagreb, 1991.



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# **KAD ŠPIJUNI SNIMAJU** **DOKUMENTARNE** **FILMOVE**

## **Prof. dr. Slaven Letica:** **Tehnologija kasnog staljinizma**

### **1. Špegelj kao metafora**

Za »dokumentarni« ili dokumentarni film o naružavanju HDZ-ovske vojske, s Martinom Špegeljom u glavnoj i demonskoj ulozi, doznao sam 25. 1. 1991. godine oko 18.30 sati od Marija Nobila. Rekao mi je da je nekakav strašan i kompromitirajući film o Špegelju i Boljkovcu prikazan na beogradskoj televiziji. Video snimku toga filma odlučili smo zajedno pogledati u Banskim dvorima oko 20 sati.

Film smo pogledali u društvu Božidara Petrača i Slavka Degoricije. Moj je osobni i prvi dojam bio mučan. Ad hock recepcija filma bila je, dakle, nepovoljna, osobito u odnosu na Špegelja i Boljkovca. Situacija je bila prilično napeta zbog toga što su se svi vodeći ljudi iz Hrvatske (Tuđman, Mesić, Manolić, Domljan) nalazili u Beogradu na razgovorima sa srbijanskim vodstvom. Istodobno zbog isteka roka koje je savezno predsjedništvo odredilo za raspuštanje tzv. paravojnih formacija rasla je u Hrvatskoj psihoza vojnog puča. Pošto je postojala i spremnost Hrvatske vlasti na puč ne dopusti, stvarala se je i psihoza rata s JNA i/ili građanskog rata. Neprecizne informacije i dezinformacije iz Beograda i u svezi s Beogradom (Ilija je Vekić, oslanjajući se na jednu takvu obavijest obavijestio Sabor da se dolazak »delegacije« očekuje oko 17 sati) dalje su pogoršavale situaciju. Širenje glasina i dezinformacija dobilo je međunarodnu dimenziju. Javljali su mi se ljudi iz Vankuvera, New Yorka, Washingtona, Berlina, Frankfurta i drugdje sa gotovo nevjerovatnim informacijama; da je Tuđman uhapšen, da je pometio i da se nije spustio, da je ubijen. Potvrda vijesti da je JNA u Virovitici uhapsila Predsjednika Izvršnog vijeća i tajnika HDZ-a, kako i vijesti o navodnom hapšenju u Slavonskom Brodu, dalje su pogoršavale situaciju.

Uglavnom, oko 21–22 sata ratna je psihoza poprimila dramatične razmjere.

U toj smo situaciji kopiju filma poslali u Sabor, gdje se još nalazilo oko 40 zastupnika i 5–6 novinara.

Zdravka Bušić je telefonom pokušavala doznati kad vrhovnici stižu iz Beograda. Oko 21 sat nazvao me je Miro Lilić i pitao što mislim da li treba objaviti film i kako. Rekao sam u da mislim da ga treba odmah objaviti i organizirati kratku raspravu u kojoj bi sudjelovali glavni akteri i neki analitičar. Ipak smo se dogovorili da nazovemo Beograd. nazvao sam Beograd dva puta. Najprije, da bi Stipu Mesića pitao o razvoju situacije oko 22 sata. Bio je zadovoljan odlukom Predsjedništva da se ide na smirivanje situacije i kazao da će se u tom smislu izdati do ponoći saopćenje. Pošto sam u 4.30 26.1. 1991. trebao sa Franom, Gogom i Bartolom otići na skijanje u Italiju, nazvao sam i Tuđmana da ga o tome priupitam i da mu predložim Lilićeve ideje. Rekao mi je da se ide na smirivanje i da stoga film možda ne bi trebalo objavljivati. Rekao je i da mogu mirno otići na skijanje. Najavio je dolazak oko 2 poslije pola noći.

S tim smo informacijama Petrač i ja otišli u Sabor. Zatekli smo četrdesetak ljudi u Domljanovoj sobi kako izbezumljeno i sa zebnjom gleda film. Bili su tu Dodan, Boljkovac, Šeks, Vekić, stari i mladi Bobetko i mnogi drugi.

Zakratko sam im predložio prekid gledanja da bi im prenio sadržaj razgovora s Tuđmanom. Usput sam rekao da se ne daju imspresionirati filmom, jer se može raditi i o falsifikatu i montaži, pa i nečem trećem.

Pošto je situacija bivala sve napetija, tako da su i ljudi djelovali poput unezvjerenih utvara, predložio sam da prije dolaska Tuđmana (Sutliću i Luki Mitroviću) netko dade smirujuću izjavu HTV-u. Brzo smo se dogovorili da to bude Petrač i Degoricija. Prvi je



JOE KOLTER  
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Congress of the United States  
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January 29, 1991

The President of The United States George Bush  
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
Dear Mr. President:

I, and thousands of my constituents whose roots go to Croatia, urge you to be very vigilant of the situation which exists in Yugoslavia today. The Yugoslavian Army's potential use of military force against the Croatian Democratic Union poses a very real threat to the democratic process which has been mandated by the people of the Republic of Croatia through their first-ever freely held elections.

While we fully understand the focus which must be directed toward Operation Desert Storm, we respectfully and fervently encourage you to be cognizant of events in Yugoslavia and to respond in a way that would protect the people of Croatia should Yugoslav officials resort to violence there.

We continue to pray for peace and a speedy resolution to difficulties in the Persian Gulf, Yugoslavia and all parts of the world who suffer oppression from governments who seek to limit their pursuits for freedom and democracy.

Sincerely,

  
Joe Kolter  
Member of Congress

JKK/clb



nutke, i možete biti sigurni da biste time stekli njegovu apsolutnu zahvalnost.

3) Ne usudujem se nadati se da biste prihvatili osobni sastanak u Zagrebu, barem na nekoliko sati, da biste mogli procijeniti stvari na poprištu događaja. Samo se od sebe razumiye da bih se angažirao da Vam osiguram sve susrete koje biste smatrali potrebnima, sa strankama i organizacijama (Vlada, opozicija, intelektualci, sindikat itd.), a, naravno, i s gospodinom Franjom Tuđmanom, predsjednikom Republike Hrvatske. Premda znam da ste zabavljeni mnogim aktiv-

nostima i iako mogu zamisliti da je Vaš kalendar za duže vrijeme ispunjen, ustrajem i ne gubim nadu da Vas uvjerim, jer sam siguran da bi Vaš boravak u Zagrebu bio velik trenutak u povijesti Centralne Evrope, kao i hrvatskoga naroda.

Imajući na umu hitnost situacije, razumjet ćete, gospodine Predsjedniče, nestrpljenje i nespokojnost s kojima ću očekivati Vaš odgovor.

Primite izraze mojega dubokog poštovanja

Stanko Lasić

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News from Senator

# BOB DOLE



(R - Kansas)

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JANUARY 18, 1991

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**STALINISM ALIVE AND WELL IN YUGOSLAVIA & SOVIET UNION:  
CRACKDOWNS ORDERED BY BELGRADE AND MOSCOW CRUSHING DEMOCRACY:  
DEADLY DEADLINE TICKS DOWN IN YUGOSLAVIA**

WASHINGTON - SENATE REPUBLICAN LEADER BOB DOLE (R-KS) TODAY ISSUED THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT REGARDING THE RECENT EVENTS IN THE BALTIC STATES:

THIS WEEK ALL EYES ARE ON BAGHDAD. BUT, THERE ARE OTHER TROUBLESPOTS AROUND THE GLOBE--PLACES WHERE THE UNITED STATES IS NOT AT WAR, BUT WHERE THE DEMOCRATIC PRINCIPLES AND FREEDOMS WE BELIEVE IN ARE UNDER SERIOUS ATTACK.

**GORBACHEV ROLLING BACK REFORMS**

AT THE TOP OF THE LIST IS THE SOVIET UNION. WHILE TANKS ARE ROLLING INTO AND OVER THE BALTICS, GORBACHEV IS ROLLING BACK GLASNOST AND REFORM. THE BRUTALITY OF THE SOVIET MILITARY IN LITHUANIA HAS LED TO HUMAN TRAGEDY--THE LOSS OF LIVES AS WELL AS THE NEAR LOSS OF DEMOCRACY. LITHUANIAN WORKERS, IN WHAT MAY BE A FUTILE EFFORT, ARE TRYING TO PROTECT THEIR PARLIAMENT FROM ASSAULT BY PLOWING DITCHES AND SETTING UP BARRICADES.

AND, WHILE THE VIOLENT OPPRESSION CONTINUES IN LITHUANIA, SOVIET TROOPS ARE BEGINNING THEIR MOVE ON LATVIA AND ESTONIA. SOVIET COMMANDOS ARE STORMING PUBLIC BUILDINGS AND FACILITIES AND INCITING PROVOCATIONS AS AN EXCUSE FOR FURTHER ESCALATING THE VIOLENCE.

**BALTIC BLACKMAIL**

WHILE THERE ARE NO TROOPS SHOOTING ON CIVILIANS IN MOSCOW, OTHER DISTURBING EVENTS ARE TAKING PLACE THERE, AS WELL. INCREASINGLY, EVENTS INDICATE THAT GORBACHEV'S COMMITMENT TO REFORM AND GLASNOST MAY HAVE BEEN ILLUSORY. I RECENTLY MET WITH THE MINISTER AT LARGE OF ESTONIA, ENDEL LIPPMAA. HE REMARKED, "SHEVARDNADZE IS RIGHT." WELL, IT SEEMS TO ME, TOO, THAT SHEVARDADZE IS INDEED RIGHT. GORBACHEV AND THE REST OF HIS MOVING TOWARD CENTRALIZED DICTATORSHIP



## Summary

SLAVEN LETICA  
MARIO NOBILO:  
THE ŠPEGELJ CASE: WAR AGAINST CROATIA  
Globus magazine, Zagreb 1991.

### Summary

Between 24th and 26th January 1991 there was to have been a military coup was to have taken place in Croatia: The whole story began back in December 1990, when the federal Ministry of Defence prepared a special communique on the enforced disarmament of so-called paramilitary units in Croatia and Slovenia. The Ministry delivered this communique to the Presidency of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia on 10 December and prepared a special Decree for the disarmament of those so-called illegal paramilitary units.

The Decree was not adopted, but neither was it rejected. It was brought up again at the meeting of the Presidency on 9 January 1991, on which occasion it was adopted. It is important to mention that there was no vote taken on the Decree, and that Mr. Stipe Mešić, representative of Croatia and Vice-President of the Presidency, was not present at the meeting. The President, Mr. Borisav Jović did not put the Decree to the vote but impressionistically decided who would be in favour adopted and who would not. Thus, an order from the »Commander in Chief of the Yugoslav Armed Forces«, which could have resulted in a military coup and/or civil war in Croatia and Yugoslavia, was adopted in a politically totally irresponsible way.

The Decree ordered all the Republican governments to disarm the so-called illegal paramilitary units within a period of ten days and promised freedom from prosecution for all individuals who handed in their weapons to the Yugoslav Army by 19 Ja-

nuary 1991. The first psychological and political crisis came at midnight on 19 January 1991. The deadline for handing in weapons was then extended for another two days, so that there was a second crisis at midnight on 21st January 1991. On 25 January 1991 the Croatian leadership went to talk to the Serbian leaders in Belgrade. The way things developed showed that this particular moment had been chosen for the army to attempt to meddle in the authority of the civilian authorities and to stage a military coup in Croatia.

In preparation for this, already on 24 January 1991, a »communique« was read to the soldiers and officers in all the units of the Yugoslav Army a »communique« was read to the soldiers and officers which contained the political basis for a possible coup. The system of values of those who wrote the communique is evident from just one sentence: »... at this point in time it may be said that the disintegration of that great country (the USSR) has slowed down. The Soviets have started to pull themselves together and to realise that the path upon which they have embarked does not lead to successful reforms but to ruination«.

The whole document is full of the neo-Stalinist jargon, glorifying communism and socialism and pointing to the dangers that threaten and are coming from the West.

As a result of this document, things began to develop at cinematic speed on 25 January 1991. While all the leading Croatian politicians were in Belgrade – President of the Republic Dr Franjo Tuđman, President of the Croatian Parliament Dr. Zarko Domljan, and Prime Minister Josip Manolić – Belgrade Television showed a documentary film on the Špegelj case, devoted to about the alleged formation of a special army by the Croatia Democratic Union. In the film,



the Croatian Minister of Defence, Martin Spegelj, was accused of organising a special army belonging to the »Party in Power« in Croatia, whose aims were terrorism and war against the Yugoslav Army. That same day a special issue of the army magazine »Narodna armija« (The People's Army) came out, printed in as many as 150.000 copies. The Serbian press began a McCarthy-style Stalinist and terrorist witch hunt in Croatia.

The general atmosphere in Croatia was like that in Hungary just before the intervention of the Soviet Army in 1956, or in Czechoslovakia in 1968, or the Baltic Republics in 1990-1991. Symptoms of a possible military coup, or civil war were stockpiling of food by families, the confinement of soldiers and officers to their barracks, and movements of heavy armed formations. Also, the preparations were being made by the active - duty and reserve police forces of the Republic of Croatia to defend themselves should the Army attack.

At the same time, the Presidency meeting discussing a new motion by the Yugoslav Ministry of Defence for an army intervention in Croatia was approved, continued until just before midnight.

Following a stormy discussion, in which the Croatian and Slovenian leaders clashed with the conservative wing of the military command and representatives of Serbia and Montenegro, a compromise was reached and it was agreed that Croatia would deactivate the reserve police force but that its weapons would remain in the hands of the civilian authorities, while the Army was to end its state of preparedness. Keeping the weapons under civilian control was important in view of the negative experience during the illegal operation in 1990, when the Yugoslav Army confiscated the weapons of the Territorial Defence force in Croatia and Slovenia (which forces are under the control of the Republican authorities in times of peace).

It was in such dramatic circumstances that the Croatian politicians returned from Belgrade and that, on 26 January 1991, the President of the Republic informed Parliament of the results of the agreement reached in Belgrade.

The book »The Spegelj Case: War against Croatia« describes the political situation as it was in January 1991, outlined above, but it also deals with the theoretical and political background and possible consequences of the »Spegelj Case«, which did not end on 25 and 26 January. The conservative, neo-Stalinist wing of the Yugoslav Army is continuing its dangerous political war games. On 30 January 1991 the military prosecutor issued an order for Minister Spegelj's arrest by the Ministry of the Interior and his appearance before an investigative judge. This was to have been the beginning of a number of Stalinist purges in Croatia, followed by more in other parts of Yugoslavia. The absurdity of such an order may be seen from the fact that in this »rigged« film the Interior Minister is accused of the same »crimes«

as Spegelj and that on the basis of a film which is for the most part a forgery the Croatian Ministers are accused and an order is given for their arrest without recourse to normal legal procedure.

Not satisfied with the peace agreement and political compromise reached, the architects and stage setters of a military intervention in Croatia and Slovenia, designed to bring down the »treacherous« governments, i.e. those looking to the West and democracy, are continuing with their project. The Serbian television made repeated screenings of this ambiguous film, day in day out, and the press and politicians in Serbia radicalised their accusations against the Croatian government and people. They are accusing them of treason, of having betrayed socialism and Yugoslavia, of plotting, terrorism, fascism, of being Ustashas, and of genocide (which, they say, is an inborn trait of the Croatian people).

The book »The Spegelj Case: War against Croatia« contains a sociological and mass-psychology analysis of Stalinism which forms the backdrop for this whole case.

The book »The Martin Spegelj Affair - War against Croatia« contains a sociological and mass-psychology analysis of Stalinism which forms the backdrop for this whole case.

The film is a paradigmatic example of rigged court cases organised in the Soviet Union for full seventy years, with more or less horrific outcomes for their victims.

The film was shot by the military secret police (so-called political police) in a manner not practised for some twenty years in the Western parts of Yugoslavia. Military agents followed the Ministers, broke into their apartments, used their own agents as crown witnesses for things they wished to prove to the other side. An independent group of experts in various fields analysed the authenticity of the film and concluded that it was more than certain that a large part of the film had been falsified and »rigged« on the cutting table.

The book gives a precise analysis of the technology (methods and procedures) of Stalinist court cases. Such cases always - regardless of whether false witnesses were used or whether the potential victim was subjected to physical and psychological torture - included several phases:

1. The determination of a »theoretical« and political basis for implementing terror (in the case in point the protection of Yugoslav unity and of communism is sought);
2. The arbitrary labelling of the »enemy«;
3. Arbitrary hatred - by means of the mass media and TV - to make terror and violence appear legitimate to the general public;
4. Subjecting people to violence and terror.

The book explains why »Watergate« is not a good analytical paradigm for the analysis of this case. In addition to analytical articles on the technology of (naive) Stalinism, the problems of the military mind



and catharsis being experienced by the Yugoslav Army in the process of its separation from the Communist Party, its depoliticisation and professionalisation, and the essence of the historical and present Croatia-Serbian conflict, the book also gives many concrete answers to the open questions brought up by the Spegelj affair.

The book shows which parts of the army's film and published documents may be reliably said to have been forged. The circumstances are explained and the inability of the military counter intelligence service to establish the real facts concerning the importation of weapons for the Croatian police is pointed out. The circumstances and legal bases are analysed upon which the ranks of active and reserve police in the Republic of Croatia were augmented, and information is given on armaments, national composition, investigative findings of the federal police, etc.

Particular attention is paid to the illegal political hunt by the military intelligence service for »counter-revolutionaries« in Croatia, and details are pointed out in the conflict of authority of the intelligence service in the Republic of Croatia and the role of the federal bodies in the whole of the Spegelj affair and in preparations for a military coup. Apart from the moral and legal issues raised by the methods used and their aims, there is also the issue of the political and criminal responsibility of individuals in top government and military ranks for the resulting situation.

Also given are details of the arrest of three military counterintelligence service men who followed and secretly filmed the Minister of the Interior of the Republic of Croatia Josip Boljkovac, as well as of preparations for kidnappings and assassinations in Croatia. The book attempts to establish whether or not there is

any connection between the ruling Croatian Democratic Union and the extreme political organisation of the Croatian Statehood Movement.

The book explains the dramatic circumstances under which the internationalisation of the Croatian issue was set into motion through diplomatic channels, this having greatly contributed to the abandonment of the military intervention.

Through the selection of reliable, authentic documents the book will be of lasting value in the study of the circumstances under which a military coup was averted and in understanding the further course of the Yugoslav crisis.

Included are documents on the Decree that was to have led to military intervention, the political platform of the cryptocommunist circles in the highest military and political ranks; reliable information on the intelligence services; details of the activities of the intelligence services; reports from the military counter-intelligence service; facsimiles of orders for weapons by the Croatian police; a shorthand record of a conversation between the American Ambassador Zimmerman and President Jovic; a shorthand record of the meeting of the Federal Presidency; information on the national structure of the Croatian police and officers corps of the Yugoslav Army; information on the arming of the Croatian police; an analysis of the actual expenditure of the Yugoslav Army; information on the concentration of military forces prepared for an attack on Croatia; police documents, and many others.

The book can be read as an exciting thriller, but it is primarily intended for those who seriously wish to study and familiarise themselves with the technology of cryptocommunist and late Stalinism on the Yugoslav soil.



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Pištoli i skrivena kamera trojice pripadnika vojne Kontraobavještajne službe, uhapšenih dok su pratili ministra policije Josipa Boljkovca.

